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ABSTRACT 
The majority of species classified as “threatened”, “endangered” or “extinct” by the 
IUCN are to be found in government controlled parks and legally protected areas in 
developing countries.  Dissatisfaction with the public sector’s record in protecting 
endangered species has prompted calls for the use of market based instruments and 
other economic incentives to promote more efficient environmental outcomes.  In this 
paper we examine whether greater reliance on market based incentives would result in 
improved environmental outcomes in national parks.  We address this issue by 
extending the incomplete contracts framework to the case of a renewable resource.  
We identify conditions under which private ownership or control of a national park 
induces more (less) efficient management of protected areas.  The paper concludes 
with a discussion of the limitations of the analysis and the implications of these results 
for the conservation of biodiversity.  5
1 General lntroduction 
The mantle of government protection has done little to reverse the growing list of 
species classified as “threatened”, “endangered” or “extinct” by the IUCN.  The vast 
majority of these species are to be found in government controlled parks and legally 
protected areas in developing countries (IUCN 2002).  The proximate causes of the 
decline in wild animal populations are well documented and vary regionally and over 
time (Soule 1987). They include: poaching, illegal logging, agriculture, mining, 
intrusive developments and land clearing.  Dissatisfaction with the public sector’s 
record in protecting endangered species has prompted calls for the use of market 
based instruments and other economic incentives to promote more efficient 
environmental outcomes.  
This drive towards the use of the market and market based instruments is widespread. 
Thus in the pursuit of the maintenance of biodiversity there is a strong movement 
towards the protection of species by commercialisation.  Examples include ranching 
for wildlife in the USA, Africa and elsewhere, the advocacy by Grigg (1995) and 
others of kangaroo farming, and crocodile farming in Australia.  These initiatives 
have often been based in part on recognition of the predominance of private land in 
such societies and they are seen as a necessary supplement to public sector 
conservation, not as an alternative .  Captive breeding programmes for the supply of 
wild animal products (such as bear bile) in Oriental medicine are yet another example 
of commercial operations.  All of these programmes to some extent attempt to harness 
market forces to serve conservation objectives. 
It is probably not possible as yet to draw any general and/or long term conclusions 
from these various policies. First because conservation objectives are complex, but 
also because they are essentially very long term.  For this reason, if for no other, it is  6
important to establish the potential of commercial operations as a conservation tool. 
We explore this issue in the context of a simple model in Sections II and III. 
Of the many market based instruments that have been suggested, privatization of 
protected areas is one of the boldest and most controversial. This usually involves the 
provocative handing back of public assets to the private sector either in whole or part. 
At the lower end of the scale , there are concessions of various sorts, for example sited 
in National Parks.  In what follows we focus on the stylized case, where a National 
Park is partly  privatized in the sense that a fraction of the residual profits accrue to 
the owner-manager. We examine whether this greater reliance on market incentives 
would result in improved environmental outcomes, specifically in terms of 
biodiversity objectives. 
  
At the outset an important qualification is in order.  A definitive description of 
biodiversity is an enormously difficult and controversial task.  Little is known about 
even the existing diversity of species.  Estimates of the total number of species vary 
one to five hundred million species (Soule 1987).  We circumvent these problems by 
assuming that individuals have well defined preferences for an “umbrella” or 
“keystone” species, whose survival is linked to the entire assemblage of life in the 
National Park under consideration (Holling et al 1995).  Top predators such as tigers 
and lions would clearly satisfy this criterion, while for other species the link may be 
somewhat more tenuous (Damania et al 2003, Karanth 2002).  A difficulty inherent in 
the pursuit of biodiversity is the selectivity of human preferences.  The “warm furry” 
syndrome perhaps epitomised by for example the Northern Spotted Owl campaign in 
the USA or the Koala concerns in Australia, remains a systemic problem in 
conservation.  While market forces are effective in signaling consumer demands,  7
there is no guarantee that species with commercial value are those in most need of 
protection. We address these and other issues in Section V.  
’.  
II OUTLINE OF THE MODEL 
In this Section we examine whether greater reliance on market based incentives would 
result in improved environmental outcomes in national parks.  We address this issue 
by extending the incomplete contracts framework to the case of a renewable 
resource.
1  We consider a natural resource such as a national park which has the 
potential to generate revenue through activities such as tourism, hunting, hiking and 
fishing.  It is assumed that these activities variously cause some degree of 
environmental damage in the park.  Administration of the park is delegated to a 
manager who can allocate effort (time and resources) to a number of activities.  These 
include effort devoted to: (i) promote tourist activities and provide services to visitors,  
(ii) activities which protect and regenerate the resource (such as the control of weeds, 
feral animals, poaching, logging, etc), or (iii) leisure (i.e. shirking).  If the manager is 
a public sector employee (PSE) (s)he receives a fixed wage, while in a “privatized” 
park some fraction of the residual profits accrue to the owner-manage,(OM). 
Clearly if it were possible to specify and enforce a complete and comprehensive 
contract, a public sector manager could be made to allocate effort in the socially 
optimal manner.  Moreover, it would also be possible to specify a contract for the 
public sector manager, which results in the same outcome as under private 
ownership.
2  However, when the allocation of effort across activities is not 
                                                 
1  Important contributions in the incomplete contracts literature include Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore 
1990 and Hart et al, 1997, Laffont and Tirole 1999.  Baker. 
2   It is worth noting that these sorts of  issues were extensively explored in much earlier literature 
which contrasted the performance of owners and  controllers ( Kamerschen 1968,  Monsen, Chui and 
Cooley  1968).  Similarly, Liebenstein’s (1966) X-efficiency  theory was heavily based on the 
difficulty of establishing complete labour contracts and spawned a large literature on related  8
contractible (i.e. non-verifiable), the outcomes may differ substantially.  For the 
public employee the allocation of effort is determined by the net marginal disutility 
(utility) derived from each non-verifiable activity, while for the private manager profit 
seeking adds a new dimension to the problem.  Since complete privatisation of 
national parks and wilderness areas seems highly unlikely, in the formal analysis we 
focus upon the more realistic situation where a manager’s rewards are linked to 
market outcomes (i.e. profits or revenue), with full privatisation being the limiting 
case.  We attempt to identify the circumstances under which the use of “high 
powered” incentives is likely to result in superior (inferior) environmental outcomes.
3  
 
The assumption that complete contracts may be impossible to specify seems plausible 
in the context of park management and wildlife conservation for at least three reasons.  
First, it is perhaps impossible to identify ex ante the full range of duties a park 
manager may be required to perform, in every contingency.  Secondly it may be 
difficult to condition contracts on measurable environmental criteria, since the 
response of ecosystems and species to human intervention is stochastic and often 
unpredictable  (May 1975).  Finally, in the absence of full information about 
biological systems, on-the-job-learning is likely to play an important role in the 
management of endangered species, which further militates against contractual 
completeness. 
 
It is assumed that the number of visitors to the park and their willingness to pay for a 
visit depends upon two key attributes: the abundance and diversity of wildlife and the 
                                                                                                                                            
motivational  issues including the question of the performance of owners versus franchisees in the then 
relatively new fast food industry e.g. (Shelton 1967) Much of this literature found significant 
differences in performance of different management regimes.    9
quality of service that is received from park employees.
4  We begin by considering the 
case of a park that is managed by a government employee who receives a fixed wage.
5  
Effort will be allocated to various tasks to equalise the net marginal benefits to the 
manager from each activity.  In contrast if the park is controlled by an owner-
manager, profits play an important role in determining effort levels.  To increase the 
profitability of the enterprise the owner-manager has a stronger incentive to raise 
revenue from park visitors. Hence, greater effort is expended on tourist related 
activities. However, increasing the flow of visitors, raises the level of environmental 
damage (i.e. lowers resource stocks).  The manager could then choose to either 
ameliorate the damage by investing in environmental repair, or simply allow the 
resource to decline.  Investment in damage mitigation and environmental protection 
will occur only if the marginal payoffs from environmental protection exceed those 
from investment in tourism.  
 
Even in this highly simplified framework we find that in general it is impossible to 
determine whether private ownership induces greater environmental protection.  
However, in Section 1V we establish several results about the relative performance of 
private management.  It is shown that the higher the level of shirking under public 
management, the greater are the opportunities for capturing environmental benefits 
through private contracting.  However, the superiority of private management also 
depends on the nature of visitor demands and the costs of environmental protection. If 
visitors place a relatively high (low) weight upon wildlife stocks, there is a stronger 
                                                                                                                                            
3 This is defined, albeit rather loosely, as maintenance and/or improvement in biodiversity. measured in 
terms of species and maintenance of the dynamic ecosystem. 
4  This assumption captures in a simple way the notion that the biological resource(s) is the key 
attraction to the park, but that the willingness to pay for the experience is likely to depend also on the 
available facilities such as the quality of accommodation, service, tour guides, transport facilities, etc.  10
(weaker) incentive to protect wildlife under private management.  Similarly, when the 
costs of environmental protection are high, there are stronger incentives in a private 
regime to reallocate effort to other activities, so that environmental outcomes 
deteriorate.  While these results appear to be intuitive, they may be of assistance in 
identifying the conditions which are necessary for high powered incentives to produce 
environmental (and welfare) improvements.  In Section V we discuss some examples 
in the light of these results.   
 
This paper is related to a growing literature on performance related pay in the public 
sector.  Much of this literature demonstrates that perverse incentive effects may arise 
when a job requires managers to perform several tasks, with only a subset of these 
being measured and rewarded.  Unsurprisingly, in such circumstances, workers 
concentrate their efforts on the rewarded task to the detriment of other objectives 
(Baker 1992, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).  In the context of the current study, 
these issues are of somewhat less significance since there is a primary and well 
defined objective – the conservation of the parks’ biodiversity. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section III presents the basic 
model.  Section IV establishes several results concerning the relative efficiency of 
private and public management regimes.  Section V discusses a number of other 
important factors that are not included in the model and concludes the paper.  
 
III THE MODEL 
                                                                                                                                            
5  The assumption of a fixed wage is both simple and realistic since it captures the usual non-
performance based mode of remuneration in the public sector.  11
Consider a biological resource such as a national park, which has the potential to 
generate revenue as well as various externalities from activities such as tourism.  
Visitor demands depend upon two key attributes of the park: the stock of the 
biological resource (such as the abundance of exotic wildlife) and the quality of 
tourist services available in the park.  Visitor demand is given by: 
Q =  12
T Xe P γγ +−      (1) 
 where X is the stock of the biological resource, e
T is tourist services provided in the 
park and P is the park entry fee.
 6 
Equation (1) implies that improvements in either tourist services (e
T), or biological 
stocks (X) will raise the level of demand. The biological resource, X, may either be 
interpreted as a single charismatic species which attracts tourists to the park (such as 
tigers, elephants, orangutans), or an assemblage of species.
7 
Public Sector Management  
We begin by considering the case where management of the park is delegated to a 
public sector employee hereafter PSE, who invests effort and available resources in 
three activities.  First, the manager may devote effort to the provision of visitor 
services (e
T).  Activities in this category might include effort and resources spent on 
providing, administering and monitoring the quantity and quality of tourist services 
provided in the park.  Second, effort may be invested in activities that protect and 
regenerate the biological resource (e
w).  These might include tasks such as the control 
of invasive species (e.g. pests and weeds), poaching and illegal logging.  Finally, we 
allow for the possibility that the manager may shirk - i.e. consume leisure (e
L).  The 
                                                 
6   It is of course possible to allow both the slope and the intercept of (1) to vary with X and e
T.  This, 
however, complicates the analysis without adding further insight. 
7  If X includes animals high in the food chain, such as the top predators, there is likely to be a close 
correlation between the steady state population of these species and the general state of the eco-system.  
Thus steady state  changes in X would provide an indication of the state of the park environment. 
However, see later comments on ‘selectivity’ in SectionV.  12
key assumption in the paper is that e
w, e
T, and e
L even if observable, are not wholly 
verifiable and hence cannot each be part of an enforceable contract.  These 
assumptions reflect a common situation in developing country national parks where 
supervision of managers is weak and penalties for poor performance are the exception 
(Breedon and Wright 1996).  
  As is common place in the public sector, the PSE receives a fixed wage of w.  
In addition, (s)he obtains utility from stocks of the resource,  V(X), V’ > 0, V” ≤  0.  
This utility may either represent the manager’s intrinsic preservation value for X, or it 
may reflect a concern for loss of reputation arising from a failure to manage the 
resource satisfactorily.
8  Thus, the manager’s per period utility is given by: 
  12 () () () ()
Tw L Uw c e c e u e V X =− − + −    (2) 
where e = e
T + e
w + e
L is the total endowment of time, ci(e
K) (i = 1, 2) represents 
costs of effort invested in e
K (k = T, w) and u(e
L) is utility from leisure.  We make the 
standard assumptions about the convexity of ci(e
K): ci’ > 0, ci” > 0 (i = 1, 2), and 
concavity of u(e
L),  u’ > 0, u” < 0.  Further, for analytical tractability we let V(X) = α 
X  (α > 0).    
  The park manager is assumed to be a fully tenured employee.  It is recognised 
that this assumption may not apply in many cases – particularly in developing 
countries where appointments may be influenced by political considerations.  
Moreover, as is well established, tenure insecurity (like undefined property rights) is 
likely to induce short term opportunistic behaviour and would thus bias the results 
against any management regime associated with high levels of uncertainty.  Since, the 
main aim of this paper is to explore the effects of high powered incentives when all 
other factors are held constant, we abstract from considerations of tenure insecurity.   13
However, in Section V we return to this issue and discuss the effects of uncertainty 
over tenure on environmental outcomes.    
  Turning next to the biological properties of the resource.  The biological 
growth of the resource is given by f(X), f” < 0.  Visitors to the park cause 
environmental damage defined by θQ, where θ is a damage parameter.
9   On the other 
hand, effort invested in environmental protection and restoration has a net positive 
effect on  the regenerative capacity of the resource: γ3e
w.  Thus the net growth of the 
population is: 
   3 ()
w Xf X Q e θ γ =− +     (3) 
where f(X) describes biological growth, θ is the damage coefficient and  γ3 measures 
the effect of effort in environmental restoration (e
w) on population growth rate. 
  The manager maximises the net present value of utility given in (2), subject to 
the resource growth constraint defined in (3).  The current value Hamiltonian is: 
12 3 () () ( ) ( () )
Tw T w w H wc e ce u ee e X fX Q e αµ θγ =− − + − − + + − +  (4a) 
where µ is the costate variable. 
After rearrangement the necessary conditions simplify to: 
12 23 '' ( ) 0 ccµθ γ γ −+ − + =      ( 4 b )  
1 (( ' ) ) f µ δµ α µ θγ =−+ −        ( 4 c )  
   3 ()
w f XQ e θ γ −+ =  0       (4d) 











δθ γ δθ γ
−− = −+
−+ −+
    ( 4 e )  
                                                                                                                                            
8 It is possible that individuals who place a relatively high value on wildlife are more likely to be 
employed in such positions.  14
To interpret equation (4e) observe that the LHS represents the net marginal costs of 
allocating effort to tourist service.  This includes the direct marginal cost of effort 
devoted to tourism (-c1’) and the effects of increased tourist flows on stocks of the 





). The RHS of (4e) defines the 
net the marginal costs of allocating effort to environmental services. It includes the 
direct marginal cost of effort (-c2’), and the effects of environmental services on 







.  Thus, effort is 
allocated between e
T and e
w until net marginal costs of each activity are equated.  In 
what follows we assume that the shadow price of the resource is always positive so 
that it is optimal to conserve the resource in the steady state. 
Private Management 
Suppose instead that the government shifts to a regime of partial (regulated) 
privatisation, where a private manager (PM) or contractor is paid a fraction of visitor 
revenues.  To facilitate comparison with the public management regime, it is assumed 
that the entry fee P, is regulated by the government and is held at the same level as 
under public management.
10  Instead of receiving a fixed wage of w the private 
manager now receives a fraction b of the total revenue from tourism: bQP.  In all 
other respects, the private sector manager is identical to the public manager.  Clearly 
under full deregulation P  is set optimally to maximise payoffs and b = 1. The central 
question we consider is how effort levels and wildlife stocks vary, when at a given 
(regulated) price (P),  the park manager is allowed to retain some (or all) of the 
revenue from tourism.  
                                                                                                                                            
9  If visits are for purposes such as hunting θ may be interpreted as the usual “catchability coefficient”.  15
The private manager’s utility function is given by: 
   12 () () () ( )
Tw L
oo o o o o Ub Q P c e c e u eV X =−− +−    (5) 
 where subscript o denotes variables under private management  
The current value Hamiltonian is: 
12 3 () () ( ) ( ( ) )
Tw T w w
oo o o o oo o o o o H bPQ c e c e u e e e X f X Q e αµ θγ =−− + − − + + − +  (6a) 
The necessary conditions are: 
21 2 2 3 '' ( ) 0 oo o bP c c γµ θ γ γ −+− +=      ( 6 b )  
11 (( ' ) ) oo o bP f µ δµ α γµθγ =− − + −       ( 6 c )  
   3 ()
w
oo o f XQ e θ γ −+=  0      (6d) 













α γγ α γ θγ
γ




   (6e) 
Once again the LHS represents the net marginal benefits of investing effort in 
tourism, while the right hand side is the net marginal benefits of effort in 
environmental restoration.    Comparing (4e) and (6e) it can be seen that the 
introduction of higher powered incentives has ambiguous effects on the net marginal 
returns to effort allocated to each activity.  On the one hand, the rewards to effort 
invested in tourism are increased by bγ2P – an amount reflecting the marginal revenue 
from visitor flows.  Ceteris paribus this will induce a greater allocation of effort to 
tourism.  On the other hand, increased visitor flows result in greater environmental 












), which may 
be either greater or lower than under public management.
11   The overall effect is thus 
                                                                                                                                            
10 We discuss the effects of full unregulated privatisation later in the paper. 
11  The shadow value is unambiguously higher if f’o > f’  (i.e. Xo > X).  16
ambiguous.  A similar argument reveals that  it is not possible to determine the effects 
of privatisation on either effort in environmental restoration, or resource stocks at this 
level of generality.   
Intuitively, the ambiguity arises from the conflicting forces under privatisation.  Since 
the manager’s payoffs depend on tourism, there is a greater incentive to raise revenue 
from park visitors.  Thus, ceteris paribus, effort levels invested in tourism will rise.  
However, there is a cost associated with this.  Increasing the flow of visitors, raises 
the level of environmental damage (i.e. lowers resource stocks), which in turn reduces 
visitor demands.  The manager could then choose to either ameliorate the damage by 
investing in environmental repair, or simply allow the wildlife population to decline.  
Effort will be invested in damage mitigation only if the marginal payoffs from 
increasing (or maintaining) wildlife stocks, exceed those from investment in tourist 
related activities.  Thus the outcome will depend upon the parameters of the problem - 
an issue that we address in the following section. 
Finally, by differentiation of (6a) we note that if the park is fully privatized and the 


















    (7) 
where b = 1 
If the regulated price (P) is less than the optimal profit maximising price P* then full 
privatisation yields qualitatively similar results to those discussed in this paper. 
IV Comparison of Outcomes 
To assess the effects of privatization on the allocation of effort and resource stocks we 
consider three distinct cases.  In the first it is assumed that tourists demands depend  17
primarily upon wildlife stocks, X (i.e. a relatively low value of γ2).  Next we consider 
the case where visitor demands are driven mainly by the desire to consume tourism 
services, e
T (i.e. a relatively low value of γ1).  Finally we explore the effects of 
allowing costs and shirking incentives to vary. 
 
The main results are summarized in the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1a:  If visitor demands  depend mainly upon wildlife stocks, then an 
increase in b (the proportion of revenue from tourism paid to the manager) has the 
following effects. There is: (i) less effort invested in tourism services,  (ii) greater 
effort is invested in environmental restoration and (iii)  resource stocks rise, 
(i.e. As γ2 → 0, then  0,   0,   0
TW de de dX
db db db
<> > .) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Intuitively, an increase in b makes the manager more responsive to consumer 
preferences.  Since visitors place a relatively higher weight upon wildlife stocks, there 
is a strong incentive to protect wildlife in order to maximize and sustain revenue from 
tourism.  There is a reallocation of effort from tourism services to environmental 
protection and restoration. Moreover, it can be shown that there is an overall decline 
in the consumption of leisure, which implies that the increase in effort devoted to 
environmental services exceeds the decline in effort invested in tourism.  Thus, when 
tourist demands are linked to stocks of  wildlife, market driven incentives strongly 
serve  conservation objectives and generate overall welfare gains.  
  18
Proposition 1b:  If visitor demands depend mainly upon the level of tourism services, 
then an increase in b (the proportion of revenue from tourism paid to the manager) 
has the following effects. There is: (i) greater effort invested in tourism services,  (ii) 
greater effort is invested in environmental restoration only if the damage caused by 
visitors is sufficiently high and (iii) the effect on resource stocks is ambiguous. 
(i.e. As γ1 → 0, then  0,   0 if  ,   ( )0
TW de de dX
db db db
θθ >> > < <  .) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
In this case visitor demands depend mainly upon the level of non-wildlife related 
services.  Greater reliance on market based incentives (i.e. an increase in b) induces 
the manager to more closely align the allocation of effort to consumer preferences.  
Thus investment in tourism related services increases.  However, an increased flow of 
visitors raises the level of environmental damage.  If the damage is sufficiently high 
and exceeds a certain threshold (i.e. θθ >  ), the manager chooses to ameliorate the 
damage by investing greater effort in environmental protection.  However, since 
consumers place a relatively low weight on wildlife stocks, incentives to invest in 
environmental protection are too weak and may not necessarily offset the damage 
from greater use of the park.  Hence the impact on wildlife stocks is ambiguous.  In 
this case, greater reliance on market forces could result in adverse conservation 
outcomes.  
 
Propositions 1a and b accord entirely with intuition.  Market based incentives provide 
a strong impetus to align effort levels and services with consumer preferences.  If 
tourists place a low weight on wildlife stocks, greater dependence on market  19
incentives could lead to depletion in resource stocks.  In welfare terms, which 
management regime is superior will therefore depend on the magnitude of the relative 
distortions.  In environmental policy terms it is perhaps more important to determine 
whether market forces can be relied upon to raise wildlife stocks when consumer 
demands are not in the extreme ranges identified above, but depend upon both 
wildlife stocks and visitor services.  A priori the outcome is unclear since there are at 
least two conflicting effects.  First, under private management there is a trade-off 
between the benefits from an increased flow of tourists and the resulting need to 
invest more effort in environmental repair.  When opportunities for restoration and 
damage mitigation are limited, the private manager has weaker incentives to protect 
resource stocks.  In contrast, the incentive structure under public ownership induces 
greater levels of shirking.  Since total effort levels are higher under private 
management, there are opportunities to improve both wildlife protection and tourism 
services.
12   
The following propositions provide conditions under which the private and public 
management can be unambiguously ranked.   
 
Proposition 2a:  If α is sufficiently small, then resource stocks under private 
management are unambiguously higher than under public management. 
(i.e.  As α → 0,  Xo > X) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Recall that α measures the intrinsic utility the manager obtains from wildlife stocks.  
When α is small the public manager has weak incentives to engage in environmental 
                                                 
12 Of course all these conclusions depend on some convergence between consumers concepts of  20
improvements and there is a high level of shirking (i.e. consumption of leisure rises).  
On the other hand, the private manager is motivated by the need satisfy consumer 
demands which depend upon both, service levels and wildlife stocks.  Hence even in 
the limiting case where no intrinsic value is placed on resource stocks (i.e. α = 0), the 
private manager invests effort in both activities.  It follows that for sufficiently small 
levels of α both resource stocks and service levels are higher under private 
management, so that welfare improves unambiguously.  
 
Proposition 2b If γ3  is sufficiently small, then resource stocks under public 
management are unambiguously higher than under private management.  
(i.e.  As γ3 → 0,  Xo < X) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
 Proposition 2b has an obvious interpretation.  Recall that γ3 measures the marginal 
product of effort invested in environmental services.  As γ3 falls, opportunities for 
restoration and damage mitigation decline and the marginal payoffs from investing in 
environmental repair are low.  In this case there are strong incentives to reallocate 
effort to other activities under both public and private management.  However, since 
the private manager’s rewards are linked to the revenue raised from tourists, there is a 
stronger incentive to invest in tourist services so that visitor flows are higher and 
wildlife stocks are lower.  The weaker incentives under public management removes 
this tendency to run down resource stocks in order to generate revenue.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
ecological objectives mediated through the market and true values of ecological factors.  21
In summary the results suggests that public management is most likely to serve 
conservation objectives when visitor demands are unrelated to wildlife stocks 
(Proposition 1b) and/or the costs of protecting wildlife is sufficiently high 
(Proposition 2b).  Conversely, when public employees care little about the resource 
under their protection (Proposition 2a), or when there is high demand for wildlife 
(Proposition 1a), the shift to high powered incentives would result in a superior 
outcome.  
 
V Conclusions and Qualifications 
The protection of endangered species is a costly activity.  Estimates suggest that the 
expenditure necessary to protect (charismatic species) such as the black rhinos of 
Africa may exceed $1,000 per animal per annum.  However, actual funds available for 
protection lag substantially behind these recommended rates and are in the region of 
$200 per rhino (du Toit 1998).  Given the vast gap that exists between actual and 
required funding levels, there is an urgent need for all resources made available for 
conservation to be used efficiently.  Despite the obvious policy importance of 
improving the efficiency of endangered species protection, there appears to have been 
little formal analysis of this issue.
13   This paper has attempted to fill this gap in the 
literature.  Drawing on the incomplete contracts framework we developed a model to 
identify the circumstances under which market based incentives would promote 
greater conservation.  In general the nature of consumer demands, costs of protection 
and restoration and the incentives of government employees were shown to play a key 
role in determining the relative superiority of a market based approach.   
                                                 
13  There is a vast and growing literature on community based conservation examples include Barrett 
and Arcase 1995, Holling and Meefe 1996.  This is not an issue that we address in this paper.  It is 
acknowledged that community based initiatives may at times serve as a useful adjunct to the measures 
discussed in this paper.  22
Recent initiatives in Kenya’s wildlife sector provide a useful example which 
illustrates both the potential and limits of market based initiatives.  Over 70% of 
Kenya’s wildlife is to be found on privately owned land (Emery 1998).  Until recently 
the government retained exclusive responsibility for managing wildlife, with strict 
controls on consumptive uses of wildlife on private lands.  Since the 1980’s policy 
reforms have allowed private landholders to establish game ranches.  There has been a 
general decline in wildlife populations throughout Kenya.  However, the emerging 
evidence suggests that rates of wildlife decline are on average 40% lower on those 
private ranches which have large numbers of the “big five” charismatic species 
favoured by tourists (Emerton 1998, Norton-Griffiths 1998).  
This illustrates an important qualification, which is consistent with the conclusions of 
the model.  Markets tend to promote selectivity in that only the species that have 
commercial value, whether as tourist attractions, game targets or harvestable 
resources can be directly protected through commercialisation. Thus the pursuit of 
conservation and biodiversity through the use of market forces, would need to rely 
heavily on umbrella species and habitat spillovers. Where species of commercial 
value do not exist, market driven approaches may be of limited value.  This however, 
does not detract from a fundamental implication of the analysis Even where prospects 
for commercialisation are limited, the use of high powered incentives, conditioned 
upon measurable environmental criteria, may induce more efficient management of 
park resources  
An important issue that has not been considered in the paper is that of corruption.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that corruption amongst forest officials may be 
widespread in many developing countries (Breeden and Wright 1996). This is often a 
consequence of the relatively low wages that are paid to forest officials – frequently in  23
arrears (as in India).  The model can readily be extended to allow for the payment of 
bribes by poachers to forest officials.  It can be shown that high powered incentives 
would dilute some of the benefits from bribe taking – suggesting that in cases where 
corruption is pervasive a market driven approach may be desirable.
 14   To see why 
recall that under public management tourist demands for wildlife confer no benefit to 
the manager.  Hence a public manager will accept a bribe from a poacher whenever 
the expected payoffs from bribery exceed his/her intrinsic utility from conservation.  
In contrast under private management, tourist demands for wildlife provide an 
additional link between environmental outcomes and managerial payoffs. Hence in a 
private regime a bribe will be accepted only if the expected payoffs from bribery 
exceed both the additional revenue from tourism and intrinsic utility from 
conservation.  Thus the threshold bribe is higher under private management and this 
can be expected to reduce the incidence of corruption. 
The formal analysis has also neglected the issue of tenure uncertainty.  It is well 
known that tenure insecurity is likely to induce short term opportunistic behaviour and 
would thus favor any management regime associated with greater levels of certainty.  
There are strong reasons to suggest that tenure insecurity may be greater in public 
administrations since appointments are likely to be influenced by political 
considerations.
15  However, there are also cases where violent conflicts and the weak 
enforcement of property rights may render private ownership insecure.  Thus security 
of tenure under alternative regimes is likely vary both regionally and over time.  
Since, the main aim of this paper is to explore the effects of high powered incentives 
                                                 
14  The problem of determining the optimal rewards for environmental managers in a corrupt regime 
has been analysed by Damania (2002).  
15  Sanctuary Asia, 3, 2000 p 40 documents the case where local politicians in India have attempted to 
transfer the director Ranthambore Tiger Reserve  for “…being too concerned about tiger protectionism 
..”   24
when all other factors are held constant, we have abstracted from this issue, while 
noting its importance.    25
APPENDIX 
Proposition 1a: 
The effects of a shift to a regime of high powered incentives are qualitatively 
analgous to increasing the fraction of revenues (b) paid to the manager.  We thus 
evaluate the effects of increasing b on the FOCs defined (6b) – (6d).  Totally 
differentiating the system of equations yields: 
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Proposition 1b 
As γ1 → 0, then  0 w eb H → .  Moreover as γ1 → 0, then µ > 0 only if δ - f’ > 0.  Thus, 
0 T eb H > . Thus as γ1 → 0: 
3 () Tw w w
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    ( A 6 )  
However as θ→ 0, then de
w/db < 0 and conversely as  θ → ∞ then de
w/db > 0.  Since 
de
w/db is continuous in θ, then from the Intermediate Value Theorem it follows that 
there exists some  (0, ) θ ∈∞  , such that  
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Proposition 2a: 
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    ( A 9 )  
As α→ 0, then (A8) and (A9) simplify to: 
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 which is assumed to be positive.  By rearrangement of (6e) it then 
follows that  21 2 '' oo bPc c γ −+ −  < 0.  Thus comparing (A10) and (A11) it follows that 
'' ou f f < . Since by assumption f” < 0, then Xo > Xu.  
Proposition 2b: 
Differentiation of (4a) wrt e
w yields: 
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When γ3 = 0 there is a corner solution such that  0
w
u e = , (since c’2u > 0 and u’ > 0).  
This implies that  2 '0 u c = . Given that the shadow price of the resource µ is assumed to 
be positive, it follows that equation (4b) cannot hold for any  0.
T
u e > .  Hence  0.
T
u e =  
Differentiation of (6a) wrt e
T and e
w yields: 
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Observe that, when γ3 = 0 there is a corner solution such that  0.
w
o e =   However from 
either (A12) or (6b) it can be seen that  0
T
o e >  is feasible, when the SOCs are 
satisfied. 
It follows that Qo =γ1X +γ2e
T - P > Qu,= γ1X –P for any given X.  To determine the 
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As usual the concave function represents the biological growth curve and and the 
higher line labeled Qo is the damage curve under private management, while the line 
Qu is the damage curve under public  management.  It is clear that all steady state 
equilibria under private management occur at lower stocks.  Note also that the private 
management equilibrium A in the diagram is unstable since the harvest line intersects 
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